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Easley: Vendor Liability for the Sale of Alcohol to an Underage Person: T

NOTE

VENDOR LIABILITY FOR THE SALE OF ALCOHOL TO
AN UNDERAGE PERSON: THE UNTOWARD CONSEQUENCES OF Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co.
"I had thought it known to all humankind that when one provides alcoholic beverages to a minor, 'the unreasonable risk of
harm not only to the minor... but also to members of the traveling
public may readily be recognized and foreseen."1
INTRODUCTION

Otis Blount, age twenty, Dwaine Darby, age nineteen,
Melissa Mullis, age fifteen, and Patricia Teel, age eighteen, began
the night of April 30, 1993 at a local teen nightclub in Monroe,
North Carolina.2 The four individuals planned to meet each other
and several other friends at the nightclub between 7:00 and 8:00
p.m. 3 Before arriving at the nightclub, Blount purchased liquor
for himself and two other individuals at the City of Monroe Board
of Alcoholic Beverage Control ("Monroe ABC").4 Although Blount
went to the nightclub to meet the other teenagers, he returned to
the same Monroe ABC store during the evening to purchase more
liquor for himself and two other individuals. 5 Later that evening,
Blount left the nightclub once again.6 This time he purchased
1. Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 307, 420 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1992) (Mitchell, J.,
concurring) (citing Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 202, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959)).
2. Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 197, 505 S.E.2d 131, 132
(1998). The facts of this case are also set out in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil
Co., 127 N.C. App. 277, 488 S.E.2d 830 (1997) and in the companion case of
Estate of Darby v. Monroe Oil Co., 127 N.C. App. 301, 488 S.E.2d 828 (1997).

3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. The companion case of Estate of Darby v. Monroe Oil Co. states that
Blount purchased liquor from Monroe ABC on the evening of April 30, 1993 on
"at least" two occasions. Darby, 127 N.C. App. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 828.
6. Id. Darby notes that Blount also left the nightclub on another occasion.
On this occasion, Blount drove Darby in Darby's automobile wildly through

277
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

1

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4

278

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:277

beer from a convenience store owned by Monroe Oil Company, Inc.
("Monroe Oil").'
Around 11:00 p.m., Blount, Darby, Mullis, and Teel decided to
leave the nightclub and go to a private party.' Darby drove the
individuals in his automobile.9 On the way to the party, Darby
stopped at the convenience store owned by Monroe Oil. 10 Here,
Blount bought beer at the store for a second time that night and
consumed the beer in the parking lot.'1 Two other carloads of
teenagers from the nightclub had stopped at the convenience store
along with Blount, Darby, Mullis, and Teel. 1 2 After consuming
the beer, Blount decided to drive Darby's automobile to the
party.13 Shortly after midnight, Blount drove the automobile off a
road and into a tree.' 4 The automobile caught fire tragically killing Blount and the three teenage occupants.'" Blount's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident was 0.13.16 An investigation
of the accident indicated that Blount's alcohol use caused the

accident.

17

The administrator of the estate of Melissa Mullis sued
Monroe ABC and Monroe Oil in state court for wrongful death.'"
The law suit alleged that Defendants were negligent for selling
Union County, North Carolina. Blount traveled at high speeds, careened off the
road twice, and spun into a ditch in search of persons who scratched the initial
"DK" into Darby's automobile. Blount and Darby returned to the nightclub when
they could not find the person who scratched Darby's automobile. Darby, 127
N.C. App. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 828.
7. Id.
8. Mullis, 349 N.c. at 197, 505 S.E.2d at 132. According to Darby, Darby,
Blount, and other teenagers were asked to leave the nightclub. Darby, 127 N.C.
App. at 302, 488 S.E.2d at 828.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 197-198, 505 S.E.2d at 133..
11. Id. at 198, 505 S.E.2d at 133.
12. Id.
13. Id. Darby sat in the front passenger seat while Mullis and Teel sat in the
back passenger seat. Id.
14. Mulis, 349 N.C. at 198, 505 S.E.2d at 133.
15. Id.
16. Id. The legal limit of alcohol content under North Carolina's impaireddriving statute at the time of the accident was 0.10. Id. On October 1, 1993, the
legal limit of alcohol content under North Carolina's impaired-driving statute
was amended to 0.08. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Plaintiff brought the suit under North Carolina's Wrongful Death
Statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-18-1 to -18-8, which deals with wrongful death
and the survival of actions. Id.
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GEN. STAT.

279

sections

Act.2 °

Defendants
18B-120 to -129, known as the Dram Shop
moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Plaintiff had
failed to file the complaint within the applicable statute of limitations required by the Act. 2 ' Plaintiff then amended the complaint
alleging both a negligence per se and a common law negligence
claim.2 2 In regards to the negligence per se claim, Plaintiff alleged
that Defendants were in violation of N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B102, which prohibits the illegal sale of alcohol, and section 18B302, which prohibits the sale of alcohol to underage persons. 23 As
for the common law negligence claim, Plaintiff alleged that
Defendants were liable for the negligent sale of alcohol to an
underage person. 24
The trial court in Union County, North Carolina granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on May 10, 1996.25 The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
holding that Plaintiffs sole remedy was under the Dram Shop
Act. 26 In its opinion, the court of appeals analyzed the requirements of a wrongful death action before confronting Plaintiffs
negligence per se and common law negligence claims. 21 It determined that to maintain a wrongful death action, the estate of Mullis had to show that Melissa Mullis, had she lived, would have had

19. "Underage person" is defined as "a person who is less than the age legally
required for purchase of the alcoholic beverage in question." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-120(3) (1997). See also Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415, 418, 379 S.E.2d
23, 24 (1989). The legal age required for purchase of malt beverage, unfortified
wine, fortified wine, spirituous liquor, or mixed beverages is twenty-one. N.C.
GEN .STAT. § 18B-302(a) (1997). See also Clark, 324 N.C. at 418, 379 S.E.2d at
24.
20. Mullis, 349 N.C. at 198, 505 S.E.2d at 133. See section II for a discussion
of North Carolina's Dram Shop Act.
21. Id. There is a one year statute of limitations period under North
Carolina's Dram Shop Act. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126 (1997). See also N.C. GEN
.STAT. § 1-54(7a) (1997).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 199, 505 S.E.2d at 133.
26. Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 127 N.C. App. 277, 281, 488 S.E.2d
830, 833 (1997). Unfortunately Plaintiff was barred-from recovery under this Act
due to the statue of limitations. Id.
27. Id. at 279, 488 S.E.2d at 831.
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a negligence per se cause of action or a negligence action under
common law against Monroe Oil and Monroe ABC.2"
With this principle in mind, the court addressed for the first
time the question of "whether a plaintiff may maintain a wrongful
death action against a vendor on the basis of the vendor's unlawful sale of alcohol to an underage person in violation of section
18B-102 in general, and more specifically, section 18B-302."2 9 In
other words, the court looked at whether Plaintiff may assert a
negligence per se action against Defendants for selling alcohol to
an underage person. The court quickly determined that Melissa
Mullis could not have maintained a negligence per se action
against Defendants had she lived. 30 Relying on a North Carolina
Supreme Court decision, Hart v. Ivey ,31 the court stated that section 18B-302 was not a public safety statute, because the purpose
behind the statute was to restrict the consumption of alcohol by
minors rather than to protect the driving public from intoxicated
drivers.3 2 Therefore, it ruled that violation of the statute was not
negligence per se. 3 3
Next, the court of appeals looked to Plaintiffs common law
3
negligence claim4.
Here again, it determined that Melissa Mullis
could not have maintained a common law negligence action
against Defendants had she lived.3 5 Relying on Hart v. Ivey, the
court stated that North Carolina courts "have not articulated any
common law duty existing between a third-party furnishing alcohol to underage persons and the public at large."36 Thus, Defendants had no duty requiring them to refrain from serving alcohol to
underage patrons. Although the court recognized a common law
duty requiring vendors to refrain from serving alcoholic beverages
to a person they know or should know is intoxicated or under the
28. Id. at 279, 488 S.E.2d at 831-32.
29. Id. at 278, 488 S.E.2d at 831.
30. Id. at 279, 488 S.E.2d at 832.

31. 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
32. Mullis, 127 N.C. App. at 279, 488 S.E.2d at 832.
33. Id. See Hart v. Ivey, 102 N.C. App. 583, 589, 403 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1991)

"It is well-settled law in this jurisdiction that when a statute imposes upon a
person a specific duty for the protection of others, that a violation of such statute
is negligence per se." Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 280, 488 S.E.2d at 832.
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influence of alcohol, it noted that Plaintiff did not allege a violation of this common law duty. 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
decisions holding that Plaintiff could neither maintain a negligence per se action nor recover from Defendants under a theory of
common law negligence. 3 Like the court of appeals, the supreme
court summarily dismissed Plaintiffs negligence per se claim stating that a violation of section 18B-302 was not negligence per se.3 9
Reaffirming its earlier opinion in Hart v. Ivey, the court held that
the statue was not negligence per se, because it was not a public
safety statute which imposed a duty for the protection of the public.4 ° Rather, its purpose was to restrict the consumption of alco41
hol by minors.
As for Plaintiffs common law negligence claim, the supreme
court departed from the reasoning of the court of appeals by
allowing "'established negligence principles' to be applied to the
facts of plaintiffs case." a2 Therefore, it concluded that a common
law negligence action could be maintained against a commercial
vendor based on the sale of alcohol to an underage person. 43 However, the court held that this Plaintiff was not able to maintain a
common law negligence action against Defendants, because Plaintiff did not establish the four elements of a common law negligence
suit: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages. 44 Particularly, the court looked to the duty element of the common law
negligence action.45 It stated that duty is triggered "where the
risk [of danger of injury to a person] is both unreasonable and
foreseeable."46 Here, evidence that Defendants sold alcohol to
Blount who was later discovered to be underage, "without an offer
of some additional factor or factors which would put the vendor on
notice that harm was foreseeable, [was] insufficient to establish
the duty element and thus maintain a common law negligence
47

suit."
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Mullis, 349 N.C. at 200, 505 S.E.2d at 133.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 202, 505 S.E.2d at 135.
Id.
at 204, 505 S.E.2d at 136.
Id.
Id. at 205, 505 S.E.2d at 137.
Id. at 206, 505 S.E.2d at 138.
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In concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish the duty element of a common law negligence claim, the court relied on evidence such as statements from teenage friends who saw Blount on
the night of April 30, 1993.48 For example, the court quoted one
teenager as saying, ".... the only way to tell if Blount was intoxicated was 'if you knew him'... '[i]f you didn't know him, he would
be sober to you."' 4 9 Because this evidence showed that from the
vendors point of view, the transactions between Defendants and
Blount were ordinary transactions for the sale of alcohol, the court
determined that there was no indication that foreseeable harm
would occur. 5 0 Thus, there was no duty and no action for common
law negligence.
This note begins with a discussion of vendor liability for the
sale of alcohol to underage persons, specifically liability under a
dram shop act, and liability under negligence per se and common
law negligence theories. Part II examines underage age drinking
and public safety in North Carolina and on a national scale.
Finally, Part III addresses the North Carolina Supreme Court's
decision in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co. This article contends that Defendants clearly had a duty to the people who travel
on public highways not to serve alcohol to an underage individual.
Therefore, N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B-302, which prohibits the
sale of alcohol to underage persons, should be regarded as a public
safety statue, violation of which constitutes negligence per se. It
further argues that Defendants should have recognized that Mullis and others might be injured by their conduct. The supreme
court merely misinterpreted the element of duty required to maintain a common law negligence action and failed to look at the evidence and circumstances surrounding the sales to Blount as a
whole when it determined liability under a theory of common law
negligence.
I.

VENDOR LIABILITY FOR THE SALE OF ALCOHOL TO

UNDERAGE PERSONS

At common law, it was not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to an ordinary able-bodied person.5 1 Therefore, a
48. Id. at 204, 505 S.E.2d at 136.
49. Id.
50. Mullis, 349 N.C. at 206, 505 S.E.2d at 137.
51. Tobias v. Sports Club, Inc., 323 S.C. 345, 348 (1996); Estate of Mullis v.
Monroe Oil Co., 127 N.C. App. 277, 280, 488 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1997); Hutchens v.
Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 5, 303 S.E.2d 584, 587 (1996); George B. Apter, Tort
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supplier of alcohol could not be held liable for the injury or death
of a person who consumed the alcoholic beverage, nor could the
supplier be held liable for the injury or death caused to a third
party by the acts of an intoxicated patron. 2 There were several
Law - Bertelmann v. TAAS Associates: Limits on Dram Shop Liability; Barring
Recovery of Bar Patrons, Their Estates and Survivors, 11 U. HAw. L. REV. 277,
280 (1989); Steven P. Callahan, Tort Liability for Suppliers ofAlcohol, 44 Mo. L.
REV. 757, 758 (1979); Daniel R. Conrad, Intoxicating Liquors - Persons Liable:
North Dakota Extends Statutory Dram Shop Liability to Social Hosts, 71 N.D. L.
REV. 743, 745 (1995); Jon R. Erickson and Donna Harper Hamilton, Liability of
Commercial Vendors, Employers, and Social Hosts for Torts of the Intoxicated, 19
WAKE FoREST L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1983); Robert J. Evola, The Legislative
Preemption of Social Host Liability in Illinois:An Analysis of Charles v. Seigried,
21 S. Ill. U. L. J. 635, 636 (1997); Diane Schmauder Kane, Social Host's Liability
for Death or Injuries Incurred by Person to Whom Alcohol Was Served, 54 A.L.R.
5' 313 (1997); Madeleine E. Kelly, Liquor Liability and Blame-Shifting Defenses:
Do They Mix?, 69 MARQ. L. REV. 217, 217 (1986); Julius F. Lang, Jr. and John J.
McGrath, Third Party Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road.
Becomes One for the Courts, 29 ViLm. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1983-84); Jane LeopoldLeventhal, PennsylvaniaBroadens CommercialLicensee Liquor Liability for the
Service of Alcoholic Beverages to Minors: Matthews v. Konieczny, 61 TEmp. L.
REV. 643, 649 (1987); Katherine M. Mahoney, Responsible Service of Alcohol: A
Way to Reduce Injuries and ProtectAgainst Liability, 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
279, 281 (1989); Dustin Blake McDaniel, Torts: Dramshop Liability in Arkansas:
Illegal Sales of Liquor to Minors May Expose Alcohol Vendors to Expensive
Liability, 20 U. ARK. LirrLE ROCK L. J. 985, 987 (1998); Edward L. Raymond, Jr.,
Social Host's Liability for Injuries Incurred by Third Parties As a Result of
Intoxicated Guest's Negligence, 62 A.L.R. 4' 16 (1989); Andrew D. Shore, Social
Host Liability in North Carolina:Did the Supreme Court Get It Right in Hart v.
Ivey, 71 N.C. L. REV. 2149, 2152 (1993); Joel E. Smith, Common-Law Right of
Action for Damages Sustained By Plaintiff in Consequence of Sale or Gift of
Intoxicating Liquor or Habit-FormingDrug to Another, 97 A.L.R. 3d 528 (1980);
Daphne D. Sipes, The Emergence of Civil Liability for Dispensing Alcohol: A
Comparative Study, 8 REV. LITIG. 1, 3 (1988); and Mark L. Weber, Reyes v.
Kuboyama: Vendor Liability for the Sale of IntoxicatingLiquor to Minors Under
a Common Law Negligence Theory, 17 U. HAw. L. REV. 355, 358 (1995). The
common law rule was "succinctly stated" in a frequently cited passage from State
for Use of Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (Md. App. 1951):
"Apart from statute, the common law knows no right of action against a seller of
intoxicating liquors, as such, for 'causing' intoxication of the person whose
negligent or willful wrong has caused injury. Human beings, drunk or sober, are
responsible for their own torts. The law (apart from statute) recognizes no
relation of proximate cause between the sale of liquor and a tort committed by a
buyer who has drunk the liquor." Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 7, 303 S.E.2d at 588.
52. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 348; Mullis, 127 N.C. App. at 280, 488 S.E.2d at 832;
Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 5, 303 S.E.2d at 584; Apter, supra note 51 at 281;
Callahan, supra note 51 at 758; Conrad, supra note 51 at 745; Erickson, supra
note 51 at 1015; Evola, supra note 51 at 636; Kane, supra note 51; Kelly, supra
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rationales behind the old common law rule. The one most commonly cited was that consuming the liquor, not supplying it was
the proximate cause of injury.5 3 Another theory was that even if
the sale or furnishing of liquor was found to have caused a
patron's intoxication, any subsequent injury to a third party was
deemed an unforeseeable consequence of the sale of the alcoholic
beverage.54 A third justification for the common law rule was that
the business of selling liquor was legitimate, thus the purchaser
was held to be responsible. 55 Finally, it was thought that decisions regarding liability should be made by the legislature not the
courts.5 6

Today, however, most jurisdictions have rejected the common
law rule of nonliability.5 7 Many states have enacted dram shop
acts or civil damages acts which impose liability on vendors under
various circumstances.5 8 Other states that have not passed dram
note 51 at 217; Lang, supra note 51 at 1121; Leopold-Leventhal, supra note 51 at
649; Mahoney, supra note 51 at 281; McDaniel, supra note 51 at 987; Raymond,
supra note 51; Shore, supra note 51 at 2152; Smith, supra note 51; Sipes, supra
note 51 at 3; and Weber, supra note 51 at 358.
53. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 348; Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 5, 303 S.E.2d at 584;
Callahan, supra note 51 at 758; Conrad, supra note 51 at 745; Erickson, supra
note 51 at 1015; Evola, supra note 51 at 636; Kane, supra note 51; Kelly, supra
note 51 at 217; Lang, supra note 51 at 1121; Leopold-Leventhal, supra note 51 at
649; Mahoney, supra note 51 at 281; McDaniel, supra note 51 at 987; Raymond,
supra note 51; Shore, supra note 51 at 2152; Smith, supra note 51; Sipes, supra
note 51 at 3; and Weber, supra note 51 at 358.
54. Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 7, 303 S.E.2d at 588; and Sipes, supra note 51
at 3.
55. Hutchens, 63 N.C App. at 7, 303 S.E.2d at 588-89.
56. Id. at 7-8, 303 S.E.2d at 589; and Shore, supra note 51 at 2153.
57. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 348; Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 7-8, 303 S.E.2d at 58889; Apter, supra note 51 at 282; Callahan, supra note 51 at 758; Conrad, supra
note 51 at 745; Erickson, supra note 51 at 1015; Evola, supra note 51 at 637;
Kane, supra note 51; Kelly, supra note 51 at 217; Lang, supra note 51 at 1121;
Leopold-Leventhal, supra note 51 at 649; Mahoney, supra note 51 at 281-82;
McDaniel, supra note 51 at 988; Raymond, supra note 51; Shore, supra note 51
at 2152; Smith, supra note 51; and Weber, supra note 51 at 358-59. The two
leading cases rejecting the common law rule of nonliability are Waynick v.
Chicago's Last Dep't Store, 269 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1959) and Rappaport v.
Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). See Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 9, 303
S.E.2d at 590; and Sipes, supra note 51 at 6.
58. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 348-49 (citing Ala. Code § 6-5-71 (1993); ALAsKA STAT.
§ 04.21.020 (1994); AmIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-311 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 12-47-128, 12-46-112.5 (1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-102 (West 1990);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.125 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 51-1-18 to -40 (Supp.
1993); IDAHO CODE § 23-808 (1995); 43 ILL. coi p. STAT. 135 (West 1992); IND.
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shop legislation impose liability under common law negligence
principles or alcohol beverage control statutes.5 9
A.

Dram Shop Liability

In the mid-1800s, many states enacted civil damage statutes
called dram shop acts.6 0 The acts imposed strict liability on commercial vendors for injuries to third parties caused by intoxicated
patrons. 61 Although many of these states repealed their dram
shop acts after the end of Prohibition in 1933, several states began
to reenact dram shop acts in the 1970s.6 2 By 1988, thirty-seven
state legislatures had enacted some type of dram shop act.6 3 The
§ 7.1-5-10-15.5 (Burns Supp. 1996); IowA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West
Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT.ANN. § 9:2800.1 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
28- A, § 2504 (West 1988); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (West 1995); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340A-801 (West 1990); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.053 (West 1988);
CODE ANN.

§ 27-1-710 (Smith 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507-F:1 to
-8 (Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-11-1 (Michie 1996); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAw § 11-101 (McKinney 1989); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06.1 (1987); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4399.01 to .99 (Anderson 1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.950 (1988); R.I.
MONT. CODE ANN.

GEN. LAws

§§ 3-14-1 to -15 (1987);

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 57-10-102 (1989);

Tex.Alco.Bev.Code Ann. §§ 2.01 to .03 (West 1995); Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101
(1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1988); Wyo. STAT. § 12-5-502 (Supp. 1995));
Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 6, 303 S.E.2d at 588; Apter, supra note 1 at 282;
Callahan, supra note 51 at 758-59; Conrad, supra note 51 at 746; Erickson,
supra note 51 at 1015; Evola, supra note 51 at 637; Kane, supra note 51; Kelly,
supra note 51 at 218; Lang, supra note 51 at 1122; Leopold-Leventhal, supra
note 51 at 649; Mahoney, supra note 51 at 281-82; McDaniel, supra note 51 at
988; Raymond, supra note 51; Shore, supra note 51 at 2153; Smith, supra note
51; Sipes, supra note 51 at 4-6 (noting that 37 states have enacted some form of a
dram shop statute, including: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming); and Weber, supra note 51 at 358-59.
59. Tobias, 323 S.C. at 348-49; Hutchens, 63 N.C. App. at 8-9, 303 S.E.2d at
589; Apter, supra note 51 at 282; Callahan, supra note 51 at 758-59; Conrad,
supra note 51 at 746-47; Erickson, supra note 51 at 1018-24; Kelly, supra note 51
at 218; Lang, supra note 51 at 1122; McDaniel, supra note 51 at 989-91; Shore,
supra note 51 at 2153; Smith, supra note 51; Sipes, supra note 51 at 6-8; and
Weber, supra note 51 at 358-59.
60. Sipes, supra note 51 at 4.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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rationale for the enactment of these acts, and, consequently, the
imposition of liability on commercial vendors was "to deter the
sale of alcohol to [certain] classes of persons [such as minors and
the intoxicated] who were likely to injure themselves or third persons."6 4 Several of the justifications for imposing strict liability on
vendors through a dram shop act included: "(1) [vendors] can
purchase extensive liability insurance to bear the loss; (2) [vendors] can spread the cost of insurance by increasing prices; (3)
[vendors] have expertise in judging whether a person is a minor or
is intoxicated; (4) [vendors] can control the patron's consumption;"
and (5) "[i]t is more equitable to impose the cost of accidents on
those making a profit from the sale of intoxicants than on an innocent, injured third party."6 5
The North Carolina legislature passed its Dram Shop Act in
1983 as part of the Safe Roads Act.6 6 In general, an action
brought under North Carolina's Dram Shop Act is "an action
against [a] permittee or local Alcohol Beverage Control Board for
negligently selling or furnishing alcohol to an underage person
who, after becoming impaired, negligently operates a vehicle and
causes injury."67 There are several requirements explicit in the
Act, such as who may file a claim,6 8 whom a claim may be filed
against,6 9 the elements necessary for a claim,7 0 the party required
to carry the burden of proof,71 the amount recoverable, 72 and the
time limit required to file a claim.7 3 These will be discussed in the
order listed above.
Under the Dram Shop Act only an "aggrieved" party may file
a claim against a permittee or local Alcohol Beverage Control
(ABC) Board.7 4 An "aggrieved party" is defined as "a person who
sustains an injury as a consequence of the actions of [an] underage
64. Erickson, supra note 51 at 1015.
65. Id. See also Vincent A. Sheheen, Court of Appeals Expands Potential
Liability of Businessesfor the Consumption ofAlcohol by Minors, 47 S.C. L. REv.
164, 166-67 (1995).
66. Id. at 1026.
67. Darby, 127 N.C. App. at 303, 488 S.E.2d at 829. See also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-121 (1997).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1997).
69. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-125 (1997).
70. Id.
71. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-122 (1997).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-123 (1997).
73. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126 (1997).
74. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1997).
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person, but does not include the underage person or a person who
aided or abetted in the sale or furnishing to the underage person." 75 In addition to this requirement, the Dram Shop Act allows
"aggrieved parties" to recover only from certain permittees and
local ABC Boards. 76 Those considered permittees include: commercial vendors of alcohol, such as bar owners, restaurant operators, and convenience and grocery store owners.7 7 Those not
considered permittees include: parties holding only a brown bagging permit, a special occasions permit, or a limited special occasions permit, parties holding only a special one-time permit under

N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B-1002, and parties holding only per78
mits under N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B-1100.
Once it is determined that the proper parties are involved, an
aggrieved party may file a damage claim against a permittee or a
local ABC Board. Three elements must be met, however: (1) "[tlhe
permittee or his agent or employee or the local board or its agent
or employee negligently sold or furnished an alcoholic beverage to
an underage person;" (2) "[t]he consumption of the alcoholic beverage that was sold or furnished to an underage person caused or
contributed to, in whole or in part, an underage driver's being subject to an impairing substance within the meaning of N.C. GEN.
STAT. section 20-138.1 at the time of the injury;" and (3) "[the
injury that resulted was proximately caused by the underage
driver's negligent operation of a vehicle while so impaired." 7 9 It is
up to the plaintiff to prove that the sale or furnishing of alcohol to
the minor was negligent under the circumstances.8 0 Proof that
the permittee or local ABC Board sold or furnished alcohol to an
underage person without asking for proper identification to determine age is admissible as evidence of negligence. s However, the
permittee or local ABC Board may rebuke this evidence by offering its own proof that it was not negligent."2 For instance, the
permittee or local ABC Board may offer evidence that the underage person misrepresented his age, the sale or furnishing of alco75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-120(1) (1997).

76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1997). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-125
(1997); and Erickson, supra note 51 at 1028..
77. Erickson, supra note 51 at 1028.
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-125 (1997). See also Erickson, supra note 51 at
1028.
79. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-121 (1997).
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-122 (1997).
81. Id. See also Erickson, supra note 51 at 1027.
82. Id.
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hol was made under duress, or proof of good practices, including
instruction of employees regarding alcohol control laws, training
of employees, detention techniques, admonishment of patrons
regarding alcohol control laws, and detention of a patron's identification documents.8 3
Damages are limited to $ 500,000, even if an aggrieved party
successfully establishes all three elements required to maintain a
claim.8 4 Furthermore, the Act does not allow for double recovery,"- although it should be noted that the enactment of the Dram
Shop Act does not effect any common law action that may be
brought against a commercial seller for the sale of alcohol to an
underage person. 6 Finally, the statute of limitations under the
87
Act is one year.
B.

Civil Liability Under a Negligence Per Se Theory
Even before the reenactment of dram shop legislation in the
1970s, courts in the mid-1950s had started to reject the various
theories behind the common law rule of nonliability.8 8 Consequently, many courts created a cause of action based on the violation of an alcohol beverage statute.8 9 Every jurisdiction in the
nation has an alcohol beverage control statute that prohibits the
sale of alcohol to an underage person or an intoxicated person.9 0

83. Id.
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-123 (1997).
85. N.C. GEN. STAT. §.18B-128 (1997).
86. Id.
87. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-126 (1997).
88. Sipes, supra note 51 at 6.
89. Id. at 7.
90. Id. See also Julius F. Lang Jr. and John J. McGrath, Third Party
Liability for Drunken Driving: When "One for the Road" Becomes One for the
Courts, 29 ViL. L. REV. 1119, 1137 (1983-84) (citing ALA. CODE § 28-3A-25
(Supp. 1984); ALASKA STAT. §§ 4.16.030, .16.051-.052 (1980); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, -244 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-529 (1977); CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West Supp. 1984); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-47-128 (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West 1975); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 4, §§ 711, 713 (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (Supp. 1984); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 562.11 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-3-22 to -23
(1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-78(2) (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, -929
(1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 7.1-5-7-8, -14 to -15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 123.47, .49 (West Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-261, -2704 (1973);
KY. REV. STAT. §§ 244.070, .080 (1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:91 (West
1974), 26:88, :285 (West 1975 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28,
§§ 303, 1058, 1058-A (Supp. 1983); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 119 (Supp. 1983);
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By using the negligence per se doctrine, plaintiffs have been able
to prove negligence based on a criminal violation of these alcohol
beverage statutes. 1 Liability under the negligence per se doctrine is easier to establish than civil liability under a common law
negligence theory, because the negligence per se doctrine eliminates the need to establish the duty owed by an individual defendant and his breach of that duty.9 2
North Carolina has two alcoholic beverage control statues,
violation of which imposes civil liability under a negligence per se
theory. 9 3 These statutes are section 18B-302, which makes it
unlawful for any person to knowingly sell or give alcoholic beverages to underage persons, 94 and N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B305(a), which makes it unlawful for permittees or ABC Board
employees to knowingly sell or give alcoholic beverages to intoxicated persons. 9 5 Both statutes have been litigated infrequently.
Only one case to date has been litigated regarding vendor liability
under section 18B-302. That case is Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, §§ 34, 69 (West 1974 & Supp. 1984); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 436.29, (West 1978 & Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.73 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 67-1-81, -1-83, -3-53
(Supp. 1983); MO. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon 1963); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 202.055 (1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 175:6 (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 33:1-39, -77 (West 1940 & Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-16, -7B1.1 (1981); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1983);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302, -305 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4301.22, .69 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
37, § 537 (West Supp. 1983-84); OR. REV. STAT. § 471.410 (1983); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 47, § 4-493 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1984); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-1
(Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 61-5-30, -3-990 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp.
1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78 (1977); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 574-203, -5-301 (Supp. 1983); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. §§ 101.63, 106.03
(Vernon 1978 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-14 to -15, -24 (1974);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (1972); VA. CODE § 4-62 (1983); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.200, .270, .310, .320 (1962 & Supp. 1983); W. VA. CODE
§ 60-3-22 (1977 & Supp. 1984); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 125.07 (West Supp. 1983);
WYO. STAT. §12-6-101 (1981).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 7-8.
93. Erickson, supra note 51 at 1028-29.
94. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302 (1997). See also Erickson, supra note 51 at
1029.
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a) (1997). See also Erickson, supra note 51 at
1029.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

13

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4

290

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:277

Co.9 6 Two cases that were consolidated on appeal were decided
under N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18A-8, a predecessor of sectionl8B302, 9" and Hart v. Ivey 9" dealt with social host liability under section 18B-302. 99 The only case to be litigated on the issue of civil

liability under N.C.

GEN. STAT.

section 18B-305(a) is Hutchens v.

Hankins.1°°
C.

Civil Liability Under a Theory of Common Law Negligence

Another theory that has been used to establish civil liability
for the sale of alcohol to underage persons is common law negligence. As noted in the previous section, the traditional common
law rule of nonliability was modified in the 1950s to comport with
modern society. 101 As a result, many states allowed a common
law negligence suit to be maintained against a commercial vendor
for the sale of alcohol to underage persons. 10 2 North Carolina is
one of the states that has recognized such a common law negli03
gence cause of action.
96. Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 505 S.E.2d 131 (1998);
and Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 127 N.C. App. 277, 488 S.E.2d 830 (1997)
(stating "[wie confront in this appeal the novel question of whether a plaintiff
may maintain a wrongful death action against a vendor on the basis of the
vendor's unlawful sale of alcohol to an underage person in violation of N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 18B-102, in general, and more specifically, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302").
Although State v. Wilson, 127 N.C. App. 129, 488 S.E.2d 303 (1997) touches
briefly on N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302, the issue in the case concerns double
jeopardy rather than vendor liability under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-302.
97. The two cases consolidated under appeal are found in Freeman v. Finney,
65 N.C. App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531 (1983). See Erickson, supra note 51 at 1029.
98. 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
99. Id.
100. 63 N.C. App. 1, 303 S.E.2d 584, disc. rev. denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d
734 (1983). See Erickson, supra note 51 at 1029. Although Harshbarger v.
Murhpy, 90 N.C. App. 393, 368 S.E.2d 450 (1988) discusses N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18B-305(a), the action is based on a dram shop liability theory rather than
liability under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-305(a).
101. Sipes, supra note 51 at 6-7.
102. Id. (citing-13 states that recognize a common law cause of action against a
vendor including Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia).
103. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F.2d 957 (4t Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 2454 (1983); and Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349
N.C. 196, 505 S.E.2d 131 (1998) (noting that in applying principles set forth in
Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) and Camalier v. Jeffries, 113
N.C. App. 303, 438 S.E.2d 427 (1994), a common law negligence suit may be
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Negligence is defined as "the failure to exercise that degree of
care which a reasonable and prudent person would exercise under
similar conditions."' 01 In order to maintain an action for common
law negligence against a commercial vendor, a plaintiff must
establish four elements: (1) "defendants had a duty or obligation
recognized by the law, requiring them to conform to a certain
standard of conduct, for the protection of others against unreasonable risks;" (2) defendants failed "to conform to the standard
required;" (3) there was "a reasonably close causal connection
between defendants' conduct and plaintiffs injuries;" and (4) there
was "actual loss or damage."105 In other words, a plaintiff must
offer evidence of duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and dam10 6
ages in order to prevail in an action for negligence.
Each of these elements required to maintain a common law
negligence action has been analyzed, specifically the elements of
duty and proximate cause. Duty is defined as "an obligation, to
which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another." 0 7 The law imposes
upon every person the duty to exercise ordinary care to protect
maintained against a commercial vendor for the sale of alcohol to an underage
person). But note the Supreme Court of North Carolina has stated that it has
not recognized a new cause of action in allowing a common law negligence action
to be maintained against a commercial vendor for the sale of alcohol to an
underage person. Estate of Mullis, 349 N.C. at 202, 505 S.E.2d at 135. Rather, it
has allowed "established negligence principles" to be applied to the facts of each
case. Id.
104. Mullis, 349 N.C. at 201, 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (citing Hart v. Ivey,
332 N.C. 299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (1992)); and Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C.
299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (1992) (citing Bolkhir v. N.C. State Univ., 321
N.C. 706, 365 S.E.2d 898 (1988); Lentz v. Gardin, 294 N.C. 425, 241 S.E.2d 508
(1978); Williams v. Trust Co., 292 N.C. 416, 233 S.E.2d 589 (1977); and Clarke v.
Holman, 274 N.C. 425, 163 S.E.2d 783 (1968).
105. Winters v. Lee, 115 N.C. App. 692, 694, 446 S.E.2d 123, 124 (1994) (citing
Southerland v. Kapp, 59 N.C. App. 94, 95, 295 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1982); and W.
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 30 (5' ed. 1984));
and Freeman v. Finney, 65 N.C. App. 526, 528-29, 309 S.E.2d 531, 533-34 (1983)
(citing Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 13, 303 S.E.2d 584, 592, review
denied, 309 N.C. 191, 305 S.E.2d 734 (1983), quoting W. Prosser, The Law of
Torts, § 30, p. 143 (4 th ed. 1971)).
106. Mullis, 349 N.C. at 201, 505 S.E.2d at 135 (citing Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C.
299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177-78 (1992); and Lamm v. Bissette Realty, Inc., 327
N.C. 412, 395 S.E.2d 112 (1990)).
107. Peal v. Smith, 115 N.C. App. 225, 230, 444 S.E.2d 673, 677 (1994) (citing
W. Page Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, § 53 (5 ed. 1984)).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

15

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 2 [1999], Art. 4

292

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:277

others.' 08 Whether duty is present in a particular case is a question of law and can only be determined by the court. 0 9 A breach
of duty is considered negligence, 110 and the breach may be made
by a negligent act or a negligent failure to act."' Finally, proximate cause is "a cause which in natural and continuous sequence
produces a plaintiffs injuries and one from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result
or some similar injurious result was probable. " 11 2 A proximate
cause analysis is determined by "whether a person of ordinary
prudence could have reasonably foreseen the actual results of similar injurious results from their negligent conduct."" 3 And questions concerning forseeability under a proximate cause analysis
are left to the jury." 4

II.

UNDERAGE DRINKING AND PUBLIC SAFETY

Before analyzing the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., it is necessary to
examine statistics concerning teenage alcohol-related motor vehicle accidents. The prevalence of underage drinking and driving is
an important factor in the issues of the case.
A.

Alcohol-Related Automobile Accidents Generally

There is no question that driving an automobile while under
the influence of alcohol is a deadly combination. 11 5 Deaths and
108. Id. (citing Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 305, 420 S.E.2d 174, 178 (1992)).
109. Id. (citing W. page Keeton et al. at § 37).
110. Id.
111. Hutchens v. Hankins, 63 N.C. App. 1, 13, 303 S.E.2d 584, 592 (1983)
(citing Dunning v. Warehouse Co., 272 N.C. 723, 158 S.E.2d 584, 592 (1983)).
112. Peal, 115 N.C. App. at 234, 444 S.E.2d at 679 (citing Murphy v. Georgia
Pacific Corp., 331 N.C. 702, 706, 417 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1992)).
113. Freeman, 65 N.C. App. at 29, 309 S.E.2d at 534 (citing Sutton v. Duke,
277 N.C. 94, 176 S.E.2d 161 (1970)).
114. Peal, 115 N.C. App. at 234, 444 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting "[in any case
where there might be reasonable difference of opinion as to the forseeability of a
particular risk, the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct with
respect to it,
or the normal character of an intervening cause, the question is for the jury." W.
Page Keeton et al., The Law of Torts, § 45 (5th ed. 1984)).
115. See, e.g., Bo Brismar and Bo Bergman, The Significance of Alcohol for
Violence and Accidents, 22 Alcohol Clin. Exp. Res. 299S (1998) (noting the
prevalence of alcohol in fatal road traffic accidents); Cheryl J. Cherpitel, Alcohol
in Fatal and Nonfatal Injuries:A Comparison of Coroner and Emergency Room
Data from the Same County, 20 ALCOHOL CLIN. Exp. REs. 338 (1996) (concluding
that the coroner sample studied for those injured by a motor vehicle accident was
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71% positive for alcohol and 51% positive for a blood alcohol level of .10 or higher;
whereas, those studied in the Emergency Room were only 5% positive for alcohol
and 0% positive for a blood alcohol level of .10 and higher); Mike Crilly,
Contributory Factors to Traffic Accident Deaths Identified at Coroner'sRequest,
20 J. PUB. HEALTH MED. 139 (1998) (reporting alcohol consumption as an
important contributory factor in traffic fatalities); Rita K. Cydulka et al., Injured
Intoxicated Drivers: Citation, Conviction, Referral, and Recidivism Rates, 32
ANN. EMERG. MED.

349 (1998) (citing driving under the influence of alcohol as the

most frequent cause of death on the nation's highways); Hallvard Gjerde, KariMette Beylich, and Jorg Morland, Incidence of Alcohol and Drugs in Fatally
Injured Car Drivers in Norway, 25 AcCID. ANAL. AND PREv. 479 (1993)
(concluding that 28.3% of fatally injured drivers studied were positive for alcohol
and 41.8% of fatally injured drivers studied involved in single-vehicle accidents
were positive for alcohol); Oksana T. Holubowqcz and A. Jack McLean,
DemographicCharacteristics,Drinking Patternsand Drunk-DrivingBehavior of
Injured Male Drivers and Motorcycle Riders, 56 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 513 (1995)
("[Ilt has been well established that alcohol consumption beyond a blood alcohol
concentration (BAC) of about 50 mg/dl increases the average risk of crash
involvement..." Id. at 513); Jean Y. Liu et al., Teenage Driving Fatalities,33 J.
PED. SURG. 1084 (1998) (concluding that alcohol consumption is one of two major
factors for increased risk of motor vehicle crashes and fatalities); Robert C.
Mackersie et al., High-Risk Behavior and the Public Burden for Funding the
Costs of Acute Injury, 130 ARCH. SURG. 844, 846-48 (1995) (concluding that high
risk behavior, such as driving while intoxicated, is associated with severe injury);
G. William Mercer and Wayne K. Jeffery, Alcohol, Drugs, and Impairment in
Fatal Traffic Accidents in British Columbia, 27 AccID. ANAL. AND PREV. 335
(1995) (concluding that 48% of traffic fatalities studied involved alcohol); Betha
A. Mueller et al., Hospital Charges to Injured Drinking Drives in Washington
State: 1989-1993, 30 AcCID. ANAL. AND PREv. 597 (1998) (noting that 40% of all
traffic fatalities involve drivers who have consumed alcohol); Mats Ostrom,
Harmeet Sjogren, and Anders Eriksson, Role of Alcohol in Traffic Crashes
Involving Women Passenger Car Fatalities in Northern Sweden, 56 J. STUD.
ALCOHOL 506 (1995) ("Alcohol is a well-known risk factor in fatal traffic crashes");
Eleni Petrisou et al., Relative and PopulationAttributable Risk of Traffic Injuries
in Relation to Blood-Alcohol Levels in a MediterraneanCountry, 33 ALCOHOL &
ALcOHOLIsM 502 (1998) (concluding that alcohol consumption is an important
cause of automobile injuries); Harmeet Sjogren et al., Drug and Alcohol Use
Among Injured Motor Vehicle Drivers in Sweden: Prevalence,Driver, Crash, and
Injury Characteristics, 21 ALCOHOL CLIN. Exp. REs. 968 (1997) ("Alcohol is
regarded as the most significant single factor contributing o serious and fatal
traffic crashes"); Lennart Sjobert, Risk Perception of Alcohol Consumption, 22
ALCOHOL CLIN. Exp. REs. 277S (1998) (concluding that traffic accidents are one of
the highest alcohol risks); Teri'Randall, Driving While Under Influence ofAlcohol
Remains Major Cause of Traffic Violence, 268 JAMA 303 (1992) (citing various
statistics regarding fatalities and injuries in alcohol-related traffic crashes); S.
Waller et al., Perceptions of Alcohol-Related Attendances in Accident and
Emergency Departments in England: A National Survey, 33 ALCOHOL &
ALCOHOLISM, 354 (1998) (finding that alcohol-related traffic accidents are
perceived by doctors and nurses to be one of several problematic types of alcohol-
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injuries stemming from alcohol-related automobile accidents continue to be a significant problem in our society. 1 16 The statistics
are alarming. For example, almost half of all traffic crashes
involve alcohol." 7 Reports indicate that an estimated three in
every ten people will be involved in an alcohol-related automobile
accident during their lives."' That is, approximately forty percent of all Americans can expect to be involved in an alcoholrelated crash." 9 As a result of the high number of traffic accidents involving alcohol, society loses almost two million years of
life and functioning each year. 120 In 1990, alcohol-related crashes
killed 22,084 people, one third of whom were innocent victims. 2 '
The number of fatalities that year was only about 1,500 less than
the number of homicides.' 2 2 Alcohol related accidents in 1990 also
caused 1.9 million injuries, including 43,140 people with permanent partial disabilities and 4,072 with permanent total
disabilities. 2 '
Even though statistics show some recent improvement in the
occurrence of alcohol-related traffic accidents, 2 4 alcohol remains a
persistent factor in automobile injuries and fatalities. In 1996, for
instance, an alcohol-related traffic fatality occurred every thirtyrelated attendances in the Emergency Room); Jiang Yu and Robin W. Shacket,
Long-Term Change in Underage Drinking and Impaired Driving After the
Establishmentof Drinking Age Laws in New York State, 22 ALCOHOL CLIN. Exp.
Res. 1443 (citing numerous statistics on alcohol involvement in automobile
fatalities).

116. See, e.g.,

NATIONAL HIGiWkY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC

1997 (reporting 1.5 million arrests in one year for driving under
the influence of alcohol, which is an arrest rate of 1 for every 122 drivers in the
United States).
117. Randall, supra note 115 at 303. See also Cydulka, supra note 115 at 350
(noting that alcohol is involved in approximately 55% of fatal automobile
accidents).
118. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS 1997.
119. Randall, supra note 115 at 303.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS 1997 (noting that "[tiraffic fatalities in alcohol-related crashes fell
by 6% from 1996 to 1997" and that "[t]he 16,189 alcohol-related fatalities in 1997
represent a 32% reduction from the 23,641 alcohol-related fatalities reported in
1987").
SAFETY FACTS
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one minutes and an injury occurred every two' minutes. 125 The
most current studies available show that in 1997 there were
16,189 fatalities in alcohol-related crashes. 12 6 This represents an
27
average of one alcohol-related fatality every thirty-two minutes.
Alcohol-related injuries were also prevalent in 1997. For example,
over 327,000 persons were injured in crashes where alcohol was
present, an average of one person injured approximately every
two minutes.1 28 Other studies represent a higher figure of
500,000 injuries in alcohol-related crashes. 2 9 Upon examination
of these statistics, it is not surprising that in 1997 alcohol was
involved in a total of thirty-nine percent of fatal crashes and seven
percent of all crashes. 8 °
The economic burden on society as a result of these accidents
is also staggering. The cost of alcohol-related traffic crashes in the
13
United States is approximately 148 billion dollars annually.
The economic costs are numerous, often including hospitalization
for the drunk driver and passengers, as well as hospitalization for
drivers and occupants of other motor vehicles involved in the same
alcohol-related collision, Emergency Department fees, physician
charges, rehabilitation care costs, pharmacy charges, pre-hospital
emergency care fees, outpatient care costs, property loss and damage, insurance administration time, time lost from work, lost
years of productivity, and lost quality of life. 13 2 Studies show that
the majority of these costs are being paid for by public agencies,
essentially at the taxpayers' expense. 33 For instance, a study of
7,083 persons receiving medical care as a result of drunk driving
accidents showed that forty-three percent received public funding
while only thirty-five percent received private funding.'13 The
report also indicated that those injured while drinking and driving were likely to stay in the hospital between seven and fourteen
125. Yu, supra note 115 at 1443.
126. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS 1997.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cydulka, supra note 115 at 350.
130. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY

ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY

ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY

FACTS 1997.
131. Mueller, supra note 115 at 597.

132. Id. at 597, 602-03.
133. Mackersie, supra note 113 at 846-48.

134. Id. at 846.
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days. 1 35 Another study conducted in Washington state reported
similar results. 1 36 This study concluded that forty-three percent
of the hospital charges for drivers injured in automobile accidents
were for those drivers who had been drinking. 3 7 Medicaid was
identified as the payor for forty-seven percent of the alcoholrelated hospitalizations, which was more than twice that for drivers who had not been drinking. 3 ' The study also reported that
drinking drivers had longer hospital stays, 39 and the average bill
for each alcohol-related crash injury was 18,258 dollars compared
to 14,181 dollars for a motor vehicle collision injury not involving
alcohol, 15,578 dollars for an unhelmeted motorcycle injury, and
40
13,937 dollars for an unbelted vehicle injury.'
The economic costs, injuries, and fatalities that accompany
drinking and driving in the United States are common in North
Carolina as well. For example, a study conducted by the University of North Carolina Highway Safety Research Center showed
that on an average night in North Carolina, about eleven percent
of drivers passing through checkpoints have some alcohol in their
14
system, and approximately two percent are legally intoxicated.
A more recent study indicated that in 1996, thirty-six percent of
those involved in alcohol related crashes were positive for alcohol,
and twenty-eight percent had a blood alcohol level of .10 or
higher. 1 4 2 These figures are slightly below the national aver135. Id. at 847.

136. See Mueller, supra note 115. It should be noted that this study was
considered to be an "underestimate of the true hospital-related costs of drinking
and driving, "because of the exclusion of data such as rehabilitation, outpatient
care and hospital charges associated with injured passengers or drivers of other
motor vehicles involved in the same crash." Id. at 603.
137. Id. at 599.
138. Id. at 599-600.
139. Id. at 600.
140. Id. But see, A. J. McKnight and F. M. Street, The Effect of Enforcement
Upon Service of Alcohol to Intoxicated Patrons of Bars and Restaurants, 26
AcCID. ANAL. AND PREv. 79 (1994) (noting that the comprehensive cost of a fatal

injury resulting from an alcohol-related crash is $2,785,002, and the
comprehensive cost of a nonfatal injury is $67,611. Comprehensive cost includes
medical, emergency services, productivity, employer costs, administrative, legal,
travel delay, property damage, monetary costs, and quality of life).
141.
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age. 1 43 The study also reported that in 1997, there were 1,483
Carolina, thirty-five percent of which
traffic fatalities in North
1
were alcohol-related. 4
B.

Underage Drinking and Driving

Although the statistics above regarding alcohol-related motor
vehicle accidents are alarming, the problem is even more pronounced among young drivers. 145 Young drivers between ages fifteen and twenty represent 12.1 million of the nation's drivers,
14 6
which is approximately six percent of all licensed drivers.
Unfortunately, these 12.1 million drivers are at an increased risk
1 47
for automobile crashes resulting in injuries and fatalities.
Although teens comprise only a small percentage of the total
licensed drivers in the United States, they are involved in ten to
fifteen percent of fatal crashes.1 4 Some studies even show that
teenage drivers are responsible for five times as many fatal accidents as drivers thirty-five to sixty-four years old.' 49 The economic cost of these automobile accidents in 1997 alone was 31.9
150
billion dollars.
Young drivers are not only at risk for causing injuries and
fatalities among the general public, but they are also at risk for
injuries and fatalities themselves. Reports indicate that the highest driver fatality rates for any age group are found among teenage drivers. ' 5 ' Specifically, it is estimated that the fatality rate
for teenagers is four times as high as that of drivers between ages
1-43. Id:- Iii the United States, 40.8% of those involved in alcohol-related
crashes were positive for alcohol, and 32.2 percent had a blood alcohol level of .10
or higher. Id.
144. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS (1997).
145. See, e.g., Brismar, supra note 113 at 299S-300S; Cydulka, supra note 115

at 350; Liu, supra note 115 at 1084;
ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

SAFETY

(1997). Randall, supra note 115 at 303;

and Yu, supra note 115 at 1443.

146.
FACTS

NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY

(1997).

147. See Brismar, supra note 115 at 299S-300S; and Liu, supra note 113 at

1086.
148. Liu, supra note 115 at 1086.
149. Brismar, supra note 115 at 300S.
150. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY

ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY

FACTS (1997).

151. Liu, supra note 115 at 1086-87. See also NATIONAL
TRAFFIC SAFETY FACTS (1997).

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
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twenty-five and sixty-nine. 1 5 2 And virtually every study agrees
that motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death for fifteen to twenty year olds. 1 53 In 1995, for example, 7,993 drivers
ages fifteen to twenty were involved in fatal automobile accidents,
in which 3,351 were killed.'
In 1997, 2,001,000 young drivers
were involved in automobile crashes and 7,885 were involved in
fatal automobile crashes.15 5 As a result, 3,336 young drivers were
1 56
killed and an additional 365,000 were injured.
Alcohol compounds the risk of injuries and fatalities among
young drivers and their innocent victims.' 7 Alcohol is implicated
in approximately one third15 8 to one half of all fatal crashes
involving teenagers. 15 9 One New York study concluded that drivers under the age of twenty-one are three times as likely to be
involved in alcohol-related accidents as other drivers, 6 ° and
underage persons are twice overrepresented in alcohol-related
61
fatal accidents among all licensed drivers.'
Currently, a person under the age of twenty-one dies every
three hours as a result of an alcohol-related automobile accident. 62 In 1996, thirty-seven percent of all traffic fatalities of fifteen to twenty year olds were alcohol-related, 1 63 which means that
approximately 2,324 youths were killed due to alcohol-related
152. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS (1997).
153. Cydulka, supra note 115 at 350; National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration: Traffic Safety Facts 1997. U.S. Department of Transportation,
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Washington D.C.; Randall,
supra note 113 at 303; and Yu, supra note 113 at 1443.
154. Liu, supra note 115 at 1084.
155. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS (1997).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Brismar, supra note 115 at 299S-300S (stating that "[a]lcohol
intoxication increases the risk of accidents for all drivers, and this risk is
increased for young drivers even with a lower alcohol concentration. The
combination of alcohol debut and debut as a driving license holder makes the
young drivers a high-risk group.").
158. Liu, supra note 115 at 1087
159. Stats and Facts. Iowa State University Substance Abuse prevention
Program, Sept. 14, 1998.
160. Yu, supra note 115 at 1444.
161. Id. See also Brismar, supra note 115 at 300S. "The age group 16 to 24
years is overrepresented in all types of alcohol-related road traffic accidents." Id.
162. Id. at 1443.
163. Id.
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automobile accidents.'
In 1997, thirty percent or 2,209 drivers
16 5
vehicle crashes had been drinking.
motor
in
killed
who were
Between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 1998, there were
2,689 alcohol-related automobile accidents in North Carolina
involving a driver between the ages sixteen and twenty. 1 66 These
accidents yielded 3,094 injuries and 954 total fatalities, thirty-four
of which were driver fatalities.16 7 During the next decade, approximately 100,000 people twenty-five years old and under will die in
alcohol-related accidents if the present trend continues.' 68
Perhaps the main reason for the prevalence of teenage alcohol-related crashes is that the drinking rate among teens is
high. 1 69 It is reported that over fifty percent of youths begin
drinking before ninth grade.' 70 More than fifty-five percent of
high school seniors drink, and approximately thirty-three percent
of these students binge drink. 17 1 A study conducted in 1996
reported that the drinking rate among eighteen year olds is thirtyfour percent, fifty-three percent for nineteen year olds, and fortynine percent for twenty year olds.' 7 2 Peer approval rates for
drinking were as high as eighty-two percent, 1 73 and as many as
seventy-one percent of underage persons reported that they
thought they would not get caught by law enforcement officials for
illegally purchasing alcohol.' 7 4 Although many of the youths
studied did not report drinking and driving themselves,' 7 5 approx164. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, TRAFFIc

SAFETY

(1997). See also Yu, supra note 115 at 1443.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Jennifer Gracey, Iowa State University, (last modified Sept. 14, 1998)
<http.///www.iastate.edu/deansdt_info/sa/stats.htm>.
169. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 115 at 1445-46.
170. Gracey, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Yu, supra note 115 at 1445.
173. Id. at 1446. Peer approval rates of alcohol use were 69.3 percent for 16
year olds, 75.5 percent for 17 year olds, 76.8 percent for 18 year olds, 82.4 percent
for 19 year olds, and 79.5 percent for 20 year olds. Id.
174. Id. The percentage of youths studied who thought they wold not get
caught by law enforcement officials or some other authority for purchasing
alcohol was 43.1 percent for 16 year olds, 52.7 percent for 17 year olds, 57.1
percent for 18 year olds, 71.9 percent for 19 year olds, and 54.8 percent for 20
year olds. Id.
175. Id. at 1447. Self-reported drinking and driving was 0 percent for 16 year
olds, 5 percent for 17 year olds, 4 percent for 18 year olds, 4 percent for 19 year
olds, and 10 percent for 20 year olds. Id.
FACTS
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imately twenty-five percent indicated that they had been a passenger of a drinking driver.1 7 6

III.

THE NORTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
ESTATE OF MULLIS V. MONROE OIL Co.

A.

Negligence Per Se Claim

In light of the above statistics, it seems that the North Carolina Supreme Court in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co. would
have interpreted section 18B-302 as a public safety statute. Yet,
the court ruled that the purpose behind the statute was to restrict
the consumption of alcohol by minors, not to protect the public. 177
As a result, any violation of the statute is not considered negli1 78
gence per se.
Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co. is not the only case in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted section
18B-302. i7 9 In Hart v. Ivey, a case regarding social host liability,
the supreme court also ruled that section 18B-302 was not a public safety statute.'8 0 In a divided decision, the court held that the
statute was not intended to protect the public for two reasons: (1)
it is limited to persons under twenty-one years of age; and (2) it is
not related to persons being under the influence of alcohol. 18 1 As
to the first reason, the court noted that "[a]n adult driver under
the influence of alcohol can be just as dangerous as a person under
twenty-one years of age."'8 2 Thus, it reasoned that if the statute
was intended to protect the public, it should have been inclusive of
all persons. i18 In regard to the second reason, the court stated
that the statute does not restrict the sale of alcohol to underage
persons who are intoxicated, but rather restricts the sale of alcohol to all underage persons, intoxicated or not.18 4 Because of this
statutory language, the court deemed that the statute's purpose
176. Id. The rate of youths riding with an impaired driver was 25 percent for
16 year olds, 25 percent for 17 year olds, 25 percent for 18 year olds, 28 percent
for 19 year olds, and 21 percent for 20 year olds. Id.
177. Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 200, 505 S.E.2d 131, 134
(1998).
178. Id.
179. See Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
180. Id. at 303-04, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
181. Id. at 304, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol21/iss2/4

24

1999]

Easley: Vendor Liability for the Sale of Alcohol to an Underage Person: T
VENDOR LIABILITY

was merely to restrict the consumption of alcohol of underage

persons. 185
Justice Mitchell's concurrence in the case as well as the North
Carolina Court of Appeals' decision in Hart v. Ivey l8 6 and Freeman
v. Finney1 7 regarding N.C. GEN. SWAT. section 18A-8, a predecessor to section 18B-302, produces a much better result than that
reached by the supreme court. Justice Mitchell, in a concurring
opinion, cited other cases that have interpreted statutes similar
to section 18B-302 as public safety statutes. 8 8 He noted that
"[better reasoned cases have always taken the view that laws
governing the sale of alcoholic beverages are intended to and do
enhance the well-being of the community by protecting all members of the public from the dangers arising from the indiscriminate sale of such alcoholic beverages."' 8 9 For example, the
Michigan Court of Appeals stated in a similar case, "[I]t would be
absurd indeed to maintain that one of the purposes of the statute
in question was not to protect the public from the risk of injury
caused by intoxicated minors."190 Justice Mitchell also noted that
there are several public safety interests in addition to highway
safety that are being served by section 18B-302, such as the physical and mental health of the underage persons purchasing the
alcohol.' 9 ' Finally, in response to the supreme court's reasons for
ruling that sectionl8B-302 was not a public safety statute, Justice
Mitchell stated:
Reason and common sense could only have led our General
Assembly, like all ordinary citizens, to know that minors who
drink alcoholic beverages and drive on the public highways ordinarily will be more dangerous to themselves and to the general
public than more experienced adults who drive under the influence of alcohol. Further, it should be obvious to anyone that children who drink are more likely to fall under the influence of
alcohol and to be generally more dangerous in every respect imag185. Hart, 332 N.C. at 304, 420 S.E.2d at 177.
186. 102 N.C. App. 583, 403 S.E.2d 914 (1991).
187. 65 N.C. App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531 (1983).
188. Hart, 332 N.C. at 308, 420 S.E.2d at 178-79 (citing, e.g., Marusa v.
District of Columbia, 484 F.2d 828, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Shiappacossee,
155 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959)
and Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366, N.W.2d 857 (1985).
189. Id. at 307, 420 S.E.2d at 179.
190. Id. at 308, 420 S.E.2d at 180 (citing Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611,
613, 213 N.W.2d 820, 822 (1973)).
191. Id. at 307, 420 S.E.2d at 179.
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inable than similarly situated adults. Clearly, the statute in question here was intended to protect inexperienced youths and the
general public from the danger and other dangers which arise
when minors are served alcoholic beverages. This Court should
take judicial notice of such obvious facts, including the fact that
this statue was intended by the General Assembly as a public
health and safety measure. 9 2
In Freeman v. Finney, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
reached a similar conclusion to that of Justice Mitchell in interpreting section 18A-8. The court of appeals clearly stated, "[t]he
purpose of this statute is to protect both the minor and the community at large from the possible adverse consequences of the
minor's intoxication." 93 The North Carolina Court of Appeals
again affirmed this decision in Hart v. Ivey. 19 Citing the cases of
Hutchens v. Hankins and Freeman v. Finney to support its decision, the court stated:
[w]e need not recite at any length the record of carnage on our
public highways caused by drivers (particularly those underage)
who have consumed intoxicating beverages. Needless to say, the
public, as evidenced by the actions of our legislature, has increasillegal coningly focused on the need to curtail and punish the 195
sumption of alcoholic beverages by underage persons.
Consequently, it ruled that a violation of section 18B-302 is
negligence per se.'9 6
The supreme court in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co.
should have followed these well reasoned conclusions. The statistics regarding underage drinking and driving clearly compel a different result than that reached by the court.
B.

Common Law Negligence Claim

Upon examination of the drinking and driving problem
among teenagers, it also seems that the Supreme Court of North
Carolina would have sustained Plaintiffs common law negligence
claim. Yet, the court granted summary judgment for Defendants
regarding this claim as well.' 9 7 Although the court held -that a
common law negligence suit could be maintained against Defend192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 307-08, 420 S.E.2d at 179.
Freeman v. Finney, 65 N.C. App. 526, 309 S.E.2d 531, 534 (1983).
Hart, 102 N.C. App. 583, 590-91, 420 S.E.2d 914, 919 (1991).
Id.
Id.
Mullis, 394 N.C. 196, 200, 505 S.E.2d 131, 134 (1998).
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ants for the sale of alcohol to an underage person, it ruled that
Defendants owed no duty to Melissa Mullis.19 Specifically, the
court stated, "[elvidence offered by Plaintiff indicated merely that
defendants sold alcohol to an individual who was later discovered
to be underage. Evidence of this alone, without an offer of some
additional factor or factors which would put the vendor on notice
that harm was foreseeable, is insufficient to establish the duty element and thus maintain a common law negligence suit."199
Seemingly, the duty owed by Defendants was simply a duty to
refrain from selling alcohol to individuals under the legal age
required for purchasing intoxicating liquor. Yet, the supreme
court wanted to find some additional factors to maintain the common law negligence claim, such as visible inebriation at the time
of purchase. 20 0 The court relied heavily on the cases of Hart v.
Ivey 2 01 and Camalierv. Jeffries 20 2 in granting summary judgment
for Defendants.20 3 It failed to see, however, that these cases
involved a common law negligence claim for the sale of alcohol to
an intoxicated person. There was no such claim in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co. Even so, the court continued to compare the
two cases to the present case of Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co.
Under Hart v. Ivey and Camalier v. Jeffries, the court held that
"an individual may be held liable on a theory of common-law negligence if he (1) served alcohol to a person (2) when he knew or
should have known the person was intoxicated and (3) when he
knew the person would be driving afterwards."20 4 There is no
mention of an underage person in its statement of the rule. That
is simply because Hart and Camalier did not assert a negligence
claim for the sale of alcohol to an underage person. The claim
asserted in Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co. was a common law
negligence claim for the sale of alcohol to an intoxicated individual. As such, the court should not have required more of Plaintiff
in establishing the duty element of the common law negligence
action.
198. Id. at 203-04, 505 S.E.2d at 135-36.
199. Id. at 138.
200. Id. at 137-38.
201. 332 N.C. 299, 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992).
202. 340 N.C. 699, 460 S.E.2d 133 (1995).
203. Mullis, 505 S.E.2d at 135.
204. Id. at 207, 505 S.E.2d at 138 (Frye, J., concurring) (citing Camalier v.
Jefferies, 340 N.C. 699, 711, 460 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1995)).
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Even assuming that Plaintiff needed additional factors to support the common law negligence claim, the additional factors were
present. The North Carolina Supreme Court merely failed to look
at the circumstances surrounding the sales to Blount as a whole.
The evidence did not just show that Blount was an ordinary person who purchased alcohol from Defendants and was later discovered to be underage. Rather, the evidence showed that Blount
purchased alcohol from Monroe ABC on "at least" two occasions in
the same night.20 5 Blount also purchased beer from Monroe Oil
twice in the same night.2 °6 This should have created suspicion in
the mind of the vendor or at least put the vendor on notice that
these were not just ordinary sales for alcohol. Furthermore, with
each purchase of alcohol from Monroe ABC, Blount did not just by
a small amount of liquor. Instead on both occasions, Blount
bought enough liquor for himself plus two other individuals.20 7
The evidence also showed that Blount was accompanied by other
teenage peers when purchasing the alcohol, and there were two
carloads of teenagers that accompanied Blount to Monroe Oil
when he made his last purchase. 20 8 Finally, as noted in section I,
the vendor is in a good position to monitor who buys alcohol,
because vendors have expertise in judging whether a person is a
minor or intoxicated. 20 9 All of these were additional factors the
court seemingly overlooked.
Defendants here clearly owed a duty to Mullis not to sell alcohol to an underage person. There were many factors present to
support an action for common law negligence. Defendants profited from Blount's purchases and should not have been able to
escape liability.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Legislatures and courts can effectively reduce the number of
fatalities and injuries that result from underage drinking and
driving. Several studies show that legislation in this area has
already saved many lives. For instance, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration reports that minimum drinking age
laws saved 846 lives in 1997 and have saved approximately 17,359
205. Id. at 197, 505 S.E.2d at 132. See also Darby, 127 N.C. App. at 301, 488
S.E.2d at 828.
206. Id. at 197-198, 505 S.E.2d. at 132-133.
207. Id. at 197, 505 S.E.2d at 132.
208. Id. at 198, 203, 505 S.E.2d at 133, 136.
209. See supra note 65.
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lives since 1975.210 Other reports indicate that legislation
allowing administrative license revocation 2 11 as well as legislation
enforcing zero tolerance laws have reduced fatal alcohol-related
crashes and injuries.2 1 2
Courts, however, must also do their part. As one writer
noted, "[wihile legislatures were the first to act, the courts are frequently confronted with situations in which it would seem appropriate to impose tort liability on a commercial vendor, employer,
or social host for injuries to innocent third parties caused by an
intoxicated driver." 213 Courts must recognize the prevalence and
consequences of teenage drinking and driving in analyzing cases
and in interpreting statutes, such as N.C. GEN. STAT. section 18B302. Their rulings will undoubtedly have an impact.
Angela M. Easley

210. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,

TRAFFIC SAFETY

FACTS (1997). See also Liu, supra note 115 at 1087 (stating that minimum
drinking age laws have saved more than 15,000 lives and have reduced alcoholrelated accidents by 40 percent since 1982); and Yu, supra note 115 at 1447-49.
211. Randall, supra note 115 at 304. Administrative license revocation allows
a police officer to confiscate the driver's license of any driver who fails or refuses
to take a sobriety test. Id.
212. Liu, supra note 115 at 1087. Zero tolerance laws reduce the illegal blood
alcohol level to .02 for drivers under the age of 21. Id.
213. Erickson, supra note 51 at 1013.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1999

29

